:: Lobbying the Executive, Legislative & Judicial Branches of Government ::

Interesting Lobbying Links

The Texas Observer The Pimping of the Presidency (A Must Read)

Democracy.org’s Lobbying Basics 

American League of Lobbyists Index

Hearts & Minds Effective Lobbying Techniques & Resources 

U.S. Senate Legislation and Records on Lobbying 

Common Dreams Lobbying Articles

 ***

In an attempt answer the following questions regarding Interests and Lobbying: How have interest groups/lobbying techniques changed and how have interest groups influenced policymaking decisions in the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of government?

Lobbyists seldom obtain access to the President. If they do, it is more often than not because of very close associations to the President or Cabinet members. Therefore, presidents decide the agenda by who gains access. That means groups aligned with the president’s interests get through the door and are sometimes invited. Interest groups and presidents have essentially different roles and agendas.

Lobbyists build support for their issues through informal contacts and by providing information. Presidents have access to a plethora of information. Lobbyists usually press for special benefits for their groups. They have narrow agendas. Presidents rarely have the time or interest to deal with the special benefits groups want because they are more concerned with macro- rather than micro-policy. Their policy spectrum is generally broad and dictates their agenda. They want and need public support for their broad issues.  The president wants to be identified as ‘the nation’s’ representative, which is much different from representing ‘the people.’ Despite the presidential prerogative to be the general policy leader, Congress led in Quirk and Nesmith’s study relative to general interests, which turned into special interest proposals, with Congress as the leader in initiating policy proposals (2005).

Being president gives the position quick access to communication and new technologies unknown in any other realm, such as television. When presidents tackle broad issues, they want public support. For this reason, the president goes public, often interrupting regularly scheduled programs you wanted to watch all week (!) like"West Wing ," to get across their message. The president uses outsider strategies to gain public support and publicity (Brown & Waltzer, 2005).

Lobbying the president and bureaucracy requires different strategies. Lobbying for private benefits requires insider strategies in order to lower potential conflict and visibility and increase the likelihood of obtaining the goods (Godwin & Seldon, 2002). That is, if the lobbyist can even get their foot in the door of the White House. Because of the level of publicity surrounding the president, special favors such as private goods can become public very quickly. Vice President Dick Chaney found out, after he held a meeting with all of the energy, lumber, and mining industries, how vicious publicity could turn into a lawsuit. (Tenpas, 2005; Furlong, 2005; Quirk & Nesmith, 2005)

For instance, the president can lobby Congress to adopt his policies. Though, this is also problematic as the political elements are more fragmented and polarized these days. The last three Presidents have generally found it hard to get controversial agendas through a Congress composed of independent players whose electoral success is not dependent on the President’s fate. Nevertheless, the president can rally his supporters and interest groups, those supporting his agenda and ideology, as well as Congressional liaisons to invigorate and strengthen a campaign on issues central to the agenda (Tenpas, 2005). As Ulsaner notes, “Presidents don’t just set their agendas. They don’t just decide to lobby. They are constrained by the larger political environment, including public opinion, their base in Congress, and the range of interested parties in the interest group universe (1998).” Basically, the president needs interests as much as they need the president. (Tenpas, 2005) (Furlong, 2005; Quirk & Nesmith, 2005; Ulsaner, 1998)

Interest groups can pressure and influence the president in other ways. Since salient issues are hot-button issues people can focus on, they can also cause them to vote. Groups can make their issues salient and get them to the top of the agenda by a legislator or the public (Tenpas, 2005). Groups can change a legislator’s equation by making a private good into a public issue or they can redefine issues for public consumption in order to influence them. Cigler indicates that there are three reasons for issue definition, which include events, scientific facts and propaganda (2002).

Lobbyists can also gain access to the Cabinet as well as the agencies under the president’s direction. The Cabinet as well as bureaucratic agencies deal with issues that are narrower than the president’s broader spectrum. Lobbying agencies as an insider is an excellent resource for private goods because they are generally out of the public’s purview. The public at large is not necessarily cognizant of what an agency or division actually does, and therefore groups may accomplish quite a bit, especially when industry specialists work for the agency. For example, during the current administration, most agencies relative to the environment and resources have agency directors who come from the energy, timber, and mining industries. So, when a group with an agenda relative to asbestos lobbies to reduce safety standards in manufacturing asbestos, then you might say that the bureaucracy is representing the interests it regulates. Furlong indicates that this is called capture, which is apparent in this context (2002). Essentially, at this point the industry is setting a particular policy for which may have consequences outside the arena of their own industry.

Since Congress and bureaucracy are more likely to cave to interests, Quirk and Nesmith conclude that, “In the permanent struggle to prevent or overcome interest-group capture of public policy, it would help to have a stronger presidency (2005).” But then, we are getting into Pluralism and separation of powers issues even more deeply. Theodore Lowi calls all this interest group liberalism (1979). Groups provide resources to agencies and Congress. Congress and agencies reward the group and then the group rewards them with resources and support. This is atypical of an iron triangle and it works because of Godwin and Seldon’s continuum, where the goods are private and there is low visibility and conflict – basically, the public does not know this is going on, so there is no controversy. Iron triangles provide the president with a tool to avoid controversy on popular programs, yet the current president’s agenda involves collective benefits he is trying to outsource which is quite controversial (such as Social Security).  Yet, presidents are interested in distributive issues due to budgetary shortfalls and economic conditions as well as finding money for preferred programs and initiatives. Groups in these cases, go to Congress to lobby for their factions. Since the president and Cabinet are obviously backing this policy direction, it would be pointless to spend time lobbying in that direction since Congress would legislate any bill relative to the program. (Furlong, 2005; Piotrowski & Rosenbloom, 2005; Quirk & Nesmith, 2005; Gormley, 1998)

Presidential orders and bureaucratic interim directives subverting adopted administrative rules are also tools of the executive and bureaucracy. Appointing agency heads to follow presidential policy often ensures presidential policy. These appointments may include former interest group members. Groups also advise against or for a nomination, not only of agency directors, but other key nominations as well, such as Congressional committees. These kinds of appointments tend to be more sympathetic toward the interest that promoted the appointment (Piotrowski & Rosenbloom, 2005; Gormley, 1998; Loomis, 2002).

Congress and groups use the bureaucracy to implement policy through drafting administrative rules implementing legislation. There are a variety of techniques groups can use to influence agencies either directly or indirectly, including policies, rules, resources, and personnel. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 requires a comment period relative to the rulemaking process and in some instances a hearing. Hearings are an opportunity for groups to influence legislation after the fact, during the rule-making or pre-implementation phase of policy development. This is the period where agencies interpret the legislation’s intent while promulgating rules. Written comments, rather than oral, are another way to influence rules and may be more effective because agencies are able to categorize comments into groups, relaying overall opinion. Groups can also influence the bureaucracy through Congress. Groups can utilize connections to Congressional members to hold hearings relative to agency policies and decisions. Congress also controls the budget. This can affect an agency if a group coerces a Congressional member into threatening the agency with resource cuts. This can also work the other way. Agencies can benefit when groups are pleased and attempt to gain influence with members to add resources. Groups can advocate legislation that will be detrimental to an agency. Letter-writing campaigns organized by large groups can be effective in pressuring an agency. Threats to the agency from every direction could influence outcomes, where presidential policy and directives indicate a stance, Congress has legislated a law, has control of resources, where interests can influence them all. (Piotrowski & Rosenbloom; Gormley, 1998; Loomis, 2002)

Presidents have created executive orders to empower the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review rules and regulations as a kind of oversight to control agencies rulemaking authority. President’s can use OMB to negate or nullify rules and subsequently the promulgating legislation, essentially reducing or destroying the impact of interests (private or collective goods) at the same time. Although agencies deal in both private and collective goods, narrow interests are more likely to dominate the administrative rulemaking process. This is because these interests often support government at various levels as they provide reciprocity by ‘paying up’ for these benefits. The public is also provided with transparency to the government through the Freedom of Information Act and sunset provisions on administrative agencies, which come under periodic evaluation. (Gormley, 1998; Hall, 2003)

Due to the quantity of groups lobbying the government, and the decline in effectiveness due to the quantity of groups and diversification of interests, groups are having to turn to other forms of access. This includes litigation (Piotrowski & Rosenbloom; Epps, 1998). Once a group’s options become limited or exhausted with Congress and the Presidency, groups sometimes turn to litigation. Because groups are more litigious and adversarial, the government is confronted with more opposition. This complicates the process and it is obvious party identity and/or ideology is more prominent, or even dominant relative to issues, policies, and agendas. Predominance of one group over another is currently prevalent. This pushes outside interests into defense modes and precludes effectiveness. The playing field cannot be level when only one side dominates over another.

According to Piotrowski and Rosenbloom, “Substantive rulemaking is often followed by litigation (1998).” Just as when it is financially more legible for a group to fight a bill regardless of short-term costs to do so, it is still in their interest to fight, when adopted legislation and rules are more expensive than fighting to kill them. As Congress can change legislation to refute current rules, or change and agencies resources, they also have oversight review through committee. Congress also has the opportunity to overrule administrative rules, which can be nixed by the president. Interests can affect this outcome as well. Three acts were adopted that allow an enhanced role by interests in the administrative process —- the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Negotiated Rulemaking Act and the Government Performance and Results Act. All three of these acts lay requirements and additional hoops for agencies to jump through relative to rulemaking. (Piotrowski & Rosenbloom, 2005)

The president has authority to nominate judges for appointment, which must be confirmed by Congress. Typically, presidents nominate judges who will vote predictably. The only chance groups have for influence is during nominating process. Congress votes up down or filibusters on these nominations. Congress considered a so-called ‘nuclear option’ to restrain Senators from filibustering one such nominee in 2005. According to O’Connor, interest groups have access to the judicial nominating process (2005). They work internally by testifying, preparing statements, lobbying senators, strategizing, preparing witnesses, providing member information, and organizing public campaigns (O’Connor, 2005). Groups also work as coalitions to coordinate activities, strategise, and supply resources. Externally, groups work to spread information publicly and conduct polls. (O’Connor, 2005)

Because of the legal support structure, older court cases and groups, new interests came into being and developed a pipeline for civil rights cases where they were primarily brought into the judicial system one after another, and often found success. Interests directly sponsor an individual or groups case, bringing it forward as a test case. Additionally they provide amicus briefs so that the court understands their points and possible consequences. Agenda setting activities relative to the courts by interests include using the media as a means of influence the public’s opinion and the courts and influencing the way the media frames issues. (O’Connor, 2005) According to Hacker, conservative Christian groups have used compromise, dumbing-down perspectives, incremental policy change, and “adopted norms relative to the … evolving nature of law (2005).”

Epp found that conservative judges made most civil rights laws, contrary to public opinion (1998). He found there was a phenomenon he calls the rights revolution. His research indicates four hypotheses of which he found only two to be true. He found that constitutional provisions and activist judges were not the motivating factor for the revolution and had no effect on outcomes. What he did find was strategic organizations motivated the revolution through their activities and rights consciousness. He found a causal link between the rights revolution and legal structure that supported these test cases. Included are incrementalism, structure and resources availability, a legal pipeline, and democratization of the court. (Epp, 1998)

Recent research has indicated that there are new tools utilized by new environmental groups that influence public policy through, “The use of market-based mechanisms in public policies offers interest groups a new form of participation in the policy process … [It]create[s] an interesting new mechanism of public activism for groups that wish to protect the environment but do not want to ‘lobby or litigate.’ By purchasing pollution allowances groups attempt to directly affect environmental policy outputs without entering the policy cycle as it has been previously understood (Carmen, 2002).” These new tools could be applied to similar issues in order to achieve desired results. Abelson’s study indicates that think tanks may play a more significant role as there are more direct and indirect opportunities and "access points" to influence public policy. Additionally, think tanks may face fewer constraints in conveying ideas to policy-makers (Abelson, 2000). As government relies more and more on information, think tanks play a key influential role to all branches of government as well as administrative agencies. Lobbyists, groups, and political parties hire think tanks to provide policy directives, research, or unethically, back up a policy stance similar to the current administration’s position on global warming and the Kyoto Treaty based on "junk science."

Burstein’s study of the direct impact of political parties and interest groups found that “political organizations affect policy no more than half the time; parties and nonparty organizations affect policy about equally often; [and], there is some evidence that organizational activities that respond to the electoral concerns of elected officials are especially likely to have an impact (Burnstein, 2002).” So, particularly directed resource allocation and programs to help elected officials or campaigns are more likely to find a medium for influencing policy than groups that cannot provide this incentive (Dwyre, 2002). Section 527 organizations can use this tool as indicated in Burnstein’s study. Groups that organize under this IRS designation can only advocate issues and not candidates (Dwyre, 2002). However, issue influence can be so closely tied to a candidates’ that often the public may believe it is a campaign advertisement. Candidate attack ads, common in the 1998, 2000 and 2004 elections, came from mysterious groups with no apparent agenda or connections but these groups were put in check when they were required to meet new reporting and disclosure requirements (The Brookings Institution, 2001).

This new tool of anyone who wants to influence policy, was quite robust in the 2004 elections cycle and continues to generate influence on industries, agencies, Congress, the Presidency and in some aspects, the Judiciary. These advocacy groups as well as Section 501(c) groups (non-profit tax exempt) have created new coalitions under this IRS rule, including: unions, liberal to conservative political ideology, coalitions of political ideological groups, grassroots activists, pro-business coalitions, counter union and labor groups, ideology based think tanks, voter and issue education groups, civil liberties & rights groups, conservation and environmental issue coalitions and groups, counter environmental groups, groups formed to expressly counter other 527s issue advocacy or a candidate, and voter registration drives (Center for Responsive Politics, 2004). Some of these 527’s also maintain PACs to support or defeat candidate for political office. Regardless of campaign finance reform, money stays in the same hands just as the rules are set up to keep some people in power. The Internet and e-mail has catapulted this venue into a responsive and fast way to activate members, get new members, and make inroads on issue advocacy at the grassroots level nationally and worldwide. (Cigler & Loomis, 2002; Dwyre, 2005; Loomis, 2002; Herrnson (2005); Center for Responsive Politics, 2004; The Brookings Institution, 2001; Burstein, 2002; dKosopedia, 2005)

Groups are looking at broader and diverse means of influence, provision of resources and information, strategies, tactics, and technology to influence agendas and policy. In addition, groups must look at all inter-related government levels and access points to meet their continuing goals (Furlong, 2005). Regardless of group form, regulation of what interests can do or not do, or campaign finance laws, interests will find a way (Herrnson, 2005). Presidential and Congressional campaigns continue to depend on PACs and now 527s particularly to influence their competitive margins by providing resources, services, and issue advocacy (Wayne, 2005). Interest groups continue to diversify their strategies and tools despite obstacles and rapidly expanding interests (Biersack & Viray, 2005).

 *** 

REFERENCES

Abraham, H. J. (1991). The Judiciary: The Supreme Court in the Governmental Process (8th ed.). Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Publishers.

Abelson, D. E. (2000). Do Think Tanks Matter? Opportunities, Constraints and Incentives for Think Tanks in Canada and the United States. Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations, 14 (2), 213-237.

Anderson, J. (1990). Public Policy Making: An Introduction. Houghton Mifflin College Division.

Biersack, R. & Viray, M. H. (2005). Interest Groups and Federal Campaign Finance: The Beginning of a New Era. In P. Herrnson, R. G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (2^nd ed.), (pp. 49-74). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Birkland, T. A. (2001). An Introduction to Policy Process: Theories, Concepts, and Models of Public Policy Making. New York: M. E. Sharpe.

Brewer, P. R. & Deering, C. J. (2005). Musical Chairs: Interest Groups, Campaign Fund-Raising, and Selection of House Committee Chairs. In P. Herrnson, R. G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (2^nd ed.), (pp. 141-163). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Brookings Institution, The (28 Feb 2001). Recent Developments in Campaign Finance Regulation: 527 Organizations. The Brookings Institution. Retrieved 8 March 2005 from http://www.brookings.org.

Brown, C. and H. Waltzer (2005). Lobbying the Press: Talk to the People Who Talk to America. In P. Herrnson, R. G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (2^nd ed.). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Browne, W. P. (1998). Groups, Interests, and U.S. Public Policy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. ; (2001) Rural Failure: The Linkage Between Policy and Lobbies. Policy Studies Journal, 29(1), 108-118; (2002) Exchange Theory and the Institutional Impetus for Interest Group Formation, in A. J. Cigler & B.A. Loomis (Eds.). Interest Group Politics (6^th ed.), (pp.1-33). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Burstein, P. (2002). The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns. Social Forces, 81(2), 381-409.

Carman, C. J. (2002). Brokering Interests: The Use of Market Based Policies by Interest Groups. Social Science Quarterly, 83(1), 137.

Center for Responsive Politics (——). Types of Advocacy Groups, 527 Committee Activity, & The Major Players-Active Advocacy Groups in the 2004 Election. The Center for Responsive Politics. Retrieved 8 March 2005 from http://opensecrets.org.

Charles, G. U. (27 April 2004). Why the Federal Election Commission Should Not Limit Contributions to Political Issue Organizations. Find Law’s Legal Commentary Writ. Retrieved 8 March 2005 from http://www.findlaw.com.

Cigler, A. J. & Loomis, B. A. (2002). The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics. In A.J. Cigler & B.A. Loomis (Eds.). Interest Group Politics (6^th ed.), (pp.1-33). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Cigler, A. J. & Loomis, B. A. (Eds.). (2002). Interest Group Politics (6^th ed.). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Collier, K. & Towle, M. J. (2002). Winning Friends and Influencing People: The President vs. Interest Groups. White House Studies, 2 (2), 186+.

Conway, M. M., J. C. Green, and M. Courinder (2002). Interest Group Money In Elections. In A.J. Cigler & B.A. Loomis (Eds.). Interest Group Politics (6^th ed.). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Davidson, R. H. (——). Policymaking in the Manpower Subgovernment. In The Bias of Pluralist Policy Arenas, (pp. 82-106).

dKosopedia (——). 527 Group. dKosopedia. Retrieved 8 March 2005 from http://www.dkosopedia.com.

Dwyre, D. (2002). Campaigning Outside the Law: Interest Group Issue Advocacy. In A.J. Cigler & B.A. Loomis (Eds.). Interest Group Politics (6^th ed.). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Dye, T. R. & Zigler, H. (1984). The Irony of Democracy (6^th ed.). Brooks/Cole Publishing.

Epp, C. R. (1998). The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparitive Perspective, pbk. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Furlong, S. R. (2005). Exploring Interest Group Participation in Executive Policymaking in P. Herrnson, R.G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (2^nd ed.). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Gais, T. L., Peterson, M. A., & Walker, J. L. Interest Groups, Iron Triangles and Representative Institutions in American National Government. .Journal of Political Science, 14, 161-185.

Gerber, E. R. (1999). The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Godwin, R. K. & Seldon, B. J. (2002). What Corporations Really Want from Government: The Public Provision of Private Goods. In A.J. Cigler & B.A. Loomis (Eds.). Interest Group Politics (6^th ed.), (pp.1-33). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Golden, M. M. (1998). Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 8 (2), 245+.

Gormley, W. T. (1998). Interest Group Interventions in the Administrative Process: Conspirators and Co-Conspirators in P. Herrnson, R .G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington. New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers.

Greenwald, C. and Hamm, K. E. (1986). The Role of “Subgovernments” in U.S. State Policy Making: An Exploratory Analysis. Legislative Studies Quarterly, XI, 321-351.

Hacker, H. J. (2005). Defending the Faithful: Conservative Christian Litigation in American Politics. In P. Herrnson, R. G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (2^nd ed.). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Hall, D. (2003). Administrative Law: Bureaucracy in a Democracy (2^nd ed.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Herrnson, P., Shaiko R. G. & Wilcox, C. (Eds.). (2005). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (2^nd ed.). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Herrnson, P. S. (2005). Interest Groups and Campaigns: The Electoral Connection. In P. Herrnson, R.G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (2^nd ed.), (pp. 25-48). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Kersh, R. (2002). The Corporate Lobbyists as Political Actors: A View from the Field. In A. J. Cigler & B.A. Loomis (Eds.). Interest Group Politics (6^th ed.), (pp.1-33). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Loomis, B. A. (2002). Interests, Lobbying, and the U.S. Congress: Past as Prologue. In A. J. Cigler & B.A. Loomis (Eds.). Interest Group Politics (6^th ed.), (pp.1-33). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Lowi, T. J. (1969). The Functions of Government. American Business and Public Policy, 27-40; The End of Liberalism. New York: Norton.

Meier, K .J. (1985). Regulation: Politics, Bureaucracy, and Economics. St. Martin’s Press.

Meier, K. J. & Van Lohuizen, J. R. (1978). Bureaus, Clients, and Congress. Administration & Society, 9, 447-465.

Neustadtl, A. (1990). Interest-Group Pacsmanship: an Analysis of Campaign Contributions, Issue Visibility, and Legislative Impact. Social Forces , 69(2), 549-564.

O’Connor, K. (2005). Lobbying the Justices or Lobbying for Justice? The Role of Organized Interests in the Judicial Process. In P. Herrnson, R. G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (2^nd ed.). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Overdevest, C. (2000). Participatory Democracy, Representative Democracy, and the Nature of Diffuse and Concentrated Interests. Society & Natural Resources, 13(7), 685-697.

Piotrowski, S. J. and D. H. Rosenbloom (2005). The Legal-Institutional Framework for Interest Group Participation in Federal Administrative Policymaking. In P. Herrnson, R. G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (2^nd ed.). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Quirk, P. J. and B. F. Nesmith (2005). Who Serve’s Special Interests? The President, Congress and Interest Groups. In P. Herrnson, R. G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (2^nd ed.). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Redford, E. S. & Martin, R. C. (1985). Democracy in the Administrative State. Oxford University Press.

Ripley, R. B. & Franklin, G. A. (1990). Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy, (5^th ed.). Brooks/Cole Publishing Co.

Ross, B. H. & Levine, M .A. (2001). Urban Politics: Power in Metropolitan America (6^th ed.). Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc.

Schoenbrod, D. (2003). Politics and the Principle that Elected Legislators Should Make the Laws. Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 26, 239-281.

Schulman, P. R. (1975). Nonincremental Policy Making: Notes Toward and Alternative Paradigm. The American Political Science Review, (69), 1354-1370.

Semiatin, R. J. and M. J. Rozell (2005). Interest Groups in Congressional Elections. In P. Herrnson, R. G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (2^nd ed.). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Shaiko, R. G. (2005). Making the Connection: Organized Interests, Political Representation, and the Changing Rules of the Game in Washington Politics. In P. Herrnson, R. G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (2^nd ed.), (pp. 1-24). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Tenpas, K. D. (2005). Lobbying the Executive Branch: Outside-In and Inside-Out. In P. Herrnson, R. G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (2^nd ed.). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Ulsaner, E. (1998), in P. Herrnson, R .G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington. New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers.

Wasby, S. L. (1993). A Transformed Triangle: Court, Congress, and Presidency in Civil Rights. Policy Studies Journal, 21(3), 565+.

Wayne, S. J. (2005). Presidential Elections: Traveling the Hard and Soft Roads to the White House. In P. Herrnson, R. G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (2^nd ed.). District of Columbia: CQ Press.

Wilcox, C. & Kim, D. Y. (2005). Continuity and Change in the Congressional Connection. In P. Herrnson, R .G. Shaiko & C. Wilcox (Eds.). The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (2^nd ed.), (pp. 129-140). District of Columbia: CQ Press.